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The article ‘Kakistocracy or The true story of what happened in the post-Soviet area’ argues
that the countries, emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, chose three distinct
models of development: the Baltic model, when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the
Euro-Atlantic security structures; the Belarusian model, when the country opted for an
authoritarian rule with a possible transition from the communist totalitarianism to an open
society; and the Russian model, when under the slogans of democracy and market economy
a new type of regime was established in Russia and a number of post-Soviet countries.
To characterize this new type of regime the deﬁnition of ‘kakistocracy’ has been introduced,
whichmeans amerger between the state structures and the oligarchic elements as a result of
the systematic plunder of national assets and establishment of a rule of lawlessness and
illegal usurpation of power under the slogans of democracy and market economy.
Furthermore, the split of the CiS and the formation of two groups of countries, respectively
the GUAM and the CSTO, have been considered from the viewpoint of their different
strategic goals and orientations.
A section is devoted to the cardinal differences between the strategic visions of Yeltsin and
Putin. The latter’s policy can be formulated as the Putin’s doctrine aimed at restoring Russia’s
inﬂuence through centralization of power, internally, and demonstration of military force
and energetic blackmail, externally. The kakistocratic regimes lead to a political and socio-
economic collapse, triggering popular unrest. This exactly was the reason of the ‘orange’
revolutions, which in most of the cases are the only way to topple kakistocratcy.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the other way of getting rid of kakistocracy would be
a cardinal change in Russia’s policy. While the strategic goal of the country should remain
restoring its international inﬂuence and authority, the means should shift from heavily
relying on military power and energetic resources toward focusing on the Russian spiritual
values andpotential for facing new threats and challenges to international peace and security.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Research Center, HanyangUniversKakistocracy N. Government by theworst citizens (Peter
Bowler, 2002)
1. Introduction
After almost two decades of the Soviet Union’s disinte-
gration a lot remains to be clariﬁed on what in reality took
place in the former Soviet republics, what kind of trans-
formation did they undergo andwhat are their development
ity. Produced anddistributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer reviewunder
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reasons, which have both internal and external implications.
To put it succinctly, it is crucial that a considerable part of the
planet’s population could develop its political, socio-
economic and cultural potential, internally, and contribute
to the progress of mankind and international peace and
security, externally.
The difﬁculty of in-depth understanding of the
processes and trends in the post-Soviet area stems from the
abundance of misinterpretations and false targets due to
the euphoria after the collapse of the Soviet empire which,
at ﬁrst sight, heralded the end of the Cold War and the
beginning of a new era. It was exactly in the late 1980s and
the early 1990s that Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History
and the Last Men”, predicting that history should deﬁnitely
choose liberal democracy as humanity’s ultimate achieve-
ment thus precluding any qualitatively new historic
development, became and still remains a bestseller (Francis
Fukuyama, 1992). It is exactly in 1990 that the Conference
(at present – Organization) on Security and Co-operation in
Europe adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe
(1990), where the Heads of State or Government of the
Conference solemnly proclaimed a ‘new era of Democracy,
Peace and Unity’.
Indeed, in early 1990s the ex-Soviet countries were
admitted to the United Nations1, became OSCE partici-
pating States and nowadays all of them, save Belarus and
the Central Asian countries, are members of the Council of
Europe, which per se could have been a clear indicator of
their commitment to observe human rights and funda-
mental freedoms.
This accession to the international organizations and
acceptance of the international instruments and laws went
in parallel with internal changes, which seemed to bring
about the establishment of democratic structures and
market economy, thus ostensibly materializing the
authoritative predictions of political scientists and the
enthusiastic statements of politicians.
Unfortunately, over the past twenty years the historic
reality proved to be a different one. The bypassing of the UN
Security Council in some critical decision-making
instances, the deep crisis of the OSCE, the transformation of
the Council of Europe from an exclusive into an inclusive
organization, where the behaviour of certain newly
admitted members has become subject to periodic
discussions and permanent concern – all these facts reﬂect
the deeper tendencies of a new divide and discord between
the West and the East and the international community’s
obvious failure to unite its resources and political will vis-à-
vis the new threats and challenges to international peace
and security.
While discussing the causes of this divide and consid-
ering the possible ways out of such a situation should
become subject to a comprehensive and detailed analysis,
this article aims at concentrating on the real situation in the
post-Soviet countries and its impact on the international
developments. In order to achieve this objective the article1 Except for Belarus and Ukraine, which are UN original members, and
the Russian Federation, which in its capacity as successor state took over
the USSR’s seat in the UN.will consider the different groups of states that emerged
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular, the CIS
countries and the fault lines between them. Furthermore,
an attempt will be done to formulate a deﬁnition meant to
reveal the genuine nature of the ruling regimes in the bulk
of the post-Soviet countries. It is all the more important
since the nature of power in those countries triggered the so
controversial ‘orange revolutions’, and will most probably
trigger new ones jeopardizing the security environment not
only internally, but regionally and even at a larger scale.
Understanding the real nature of the regimes that
dominate in most of the post-Soviet countries is necessary
for the politicians and the civil society both in those coun-
tries and internationally, because it is not possible to ﬁnd
a remedywithout knowing the root causes of a threat,which
is covered with the veil of good intentions but has an enor-
mous potential to spread over stealthily and imperceptibly.
2. Three models of the post-Soviet countries’
development
Homogeneous as they might seem, the Soviet republics
had different historic and cultural backgrounds, as well as
different levels of socio-economic and cultural develop-
ment. True, the communist system, its ideology, structures,
values were omnipresent in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
one could not compare the Baltic countries with the Central
Asian ones, or the Slavic republics with the Southern Cau-
casus. This stands true not only with regard to their level of
development or cultural differences, but also from the
point of view of the degree of their acceptance of the
communist regime and their attitude toward the country,
whose citizens all of them were.
Whoever has lived in the USSR knows that, for instance,
the Baltic countries have never been “truly” Soviet and
were considered as being a kind of “abroad”. On the other
hand, the Central Asian republics really owed a lot to Russia
and the communists, whose rule had been instrumental in
bringing the quasi-feudal societies there closer to the
civilized standards in education, healthcare, equal treat-
ment of women, etc.
While the Baltic republics have never accepted their
annexation by the USSR in the wake of the Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact, the others had found a kind ofmodus vivendi,
thus accommodating their own not very ambitious agendas
under the aegis of one of the two superpowers of the time.
If not entirely, these differences in perceptions and level
of progress played a signiﬁcant role in the determination of
the post-Soviet countries’ strategic directions in the
context of their historic choice after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Among other factors one could stress
the geopolitical speciﬁcs of separately taken countries, as
well as the individual qualities of the politicians who came
to power on the wave of the historic events of the late
1980s and the early 1990s.
The strategic task of any state, in particular, the one
emerged on the ruins of an empire can be described by
a very simple formula: security and well-being. The newly
independent post-Soviet countries, which after the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union lost a powerful security
umbrella and an acceptable level of well-being, found
2 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth
Congress, Second Session, March 31, 2004; Serial No. 108–86, US
Government Printing Ofﬁce, Washington 2004, p.5.
3 This thesis was ﬁrst elaborated by political analyst Andranik Mihra-
nian. See the dispute between Kliamkin and Mihranian ‘A need for an
“iron ﬁst?’ in the weekly ‘Literaturnaya Gazeta’ 16.08.1989, and A. Mih-
ranian ‘The long road to the European house’, in the magazine ‘Novi mir’
No. 7 1989, pp. 166–184.
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became obvious as soon as the new political forces took up
the reins of leadership. Whatever different the options for
tackling the unprecedented challenge might be, one can
argue that the former Soviet republics, notwithstanding the
nuances and speciﬁcs, opted for three respective models of
development: the Baltic model, the Belarusian model and
the model of the remaining countries headed by Russia. At
least a brief analysis will be important to realize the gist of
these three different models, all the more so since each of
them had its own characteristics and logic, which produced
a long-lasting effect on the domestic and external politics of
the countries in question.
3. The Baltic model
As compared to the other post-Soviet countries the
problems of security and well-being could be solved in the
most successful way by the Baltic countries. There is little
wonder to it.
Apart from the fact that the Baltic countries had joined
the Soviet Union later than the other constituent republics
and that they had always been considered as being
“abroad”, one should also single out two prevailing
circumstances that have played a decisive role in their
success story. First, the Baltic countries have always been
part of the Western, purely European civilization, and they
did not need any signiﬁcant transition period in order for
them to accept, adopt and absorb democratic values.
Second, geopolitically, the Baltic countries are closer to the
Scandinavian countries, and this Nordic vicinity could not
play but a role of a catalyst in their accelerated inclusion in
the Western European political and security realm.
Indeed, in 2004 all three countries of the region:
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became European Union and
NATO member states. More important, perhaps, is the fact
that unlike a number of other countries, which were
included in these organizations for mainly geo-strategic
and political reasons, the Baltic countries really had ach-
ieved or potentially could achieve in relatively short
historic period political and socio-economic stability and
progress based on Western standards.
True, the Soviet economic system, the existence of
communist nomenklatura, the attempts of Russia to play on
the patriotic feelings of the considerable Russian minorities
in Latvia and Estonia could at ﬁrst sight signiﬁcantly hurdle
the Baltic countries’ development and rapprochement with
theWest. Nevertheless, these hurdles were relatively easily
overcome for the above-mentioned major reasons: civi-
lizational and geopolitical vicinity to the Scandinavian
countries and through them to the Western Europe.
Thus, the Baltic model of post-Soviet development was
characterized by a relatively smooth and painless transition
from the communist totalitarianism to a Western type
democratic rule. Nowadays, these countries are fully inte-
grated in the Western European structures, and from the
point of view of further analysis, at least, in the context of
this article they do not represent any considerable interest.
In turn, what happened in the other parts of the former
Soviet Union is much more intriguing and requiring non-
standard approaches in order to be tackled and understood.4. The Belarusian model
The events in Belarus developed according to a totally
different scenario. They are inalienably linked to President
Lukashenko, who has been ruling the country since 1994. A
strict hierarchy of state structures, dubbed ‘the presidential
vertical’ and well deﬁned priorities both in domestic and
foreign policy are the main characteristics of his rule. In
other words, Lukashenko’s leadership is a combination, as
strange as it may seem, of iron ﬁst and consistent efforts to
protect the Belarusian national interests.
The country and its leader have virtually been demon-
ized, and for people in Austria, Germany or Spain, let alone
America, the Belarusian regime is nothing else but
‘Europe’s last dictatorship’. This label along with the ‘rogue
government’ or – the jewel in the crown – ‘Jurassic Park of
authoritarianism in the heart of a democratizing Europe’2
has become a kind of fairy tale roving theme, which
wanders through articles and statements, without giving
any meaningful explanation of what is really going on in
the country.
In reality, the Belarusian model of development repre-
sents quite a unique example. Unlike the other post-Soviet
countries guided by Russia, whose development model is
yet to be considered, Lukashenko could avoid plundering of
the country by a handful of oligarchs. He was able to
preserve the country’s national asset and secure real
prerequisites for a transition from the Soviet totalitarianism
to an open society through authoritarianism. The Belaru-
sian example demonstrates with all evidence that after the
collapse of the Soviet Union it was not possible to build
a democratic society and market economy just proclaiming
good intentions and devotion to democratic ideals. There
was really a need of an iron ﬁst, which would prevent
selling the country both internally and externally.3
This is not to say that the regime in Belarus is impec-
cable. Examples of the authorities’ restrictive policies
toward a number of fundamental human rights, in partic-
ular, freedom of expression and assembly, as well as their
obvious reluctance to promote independent civil society are
more than enough. However, whatmatters in the context of
this article is the overall algorithm of the Belarusian
development after its independence. Belarus’ real problem
is not that it is a dictatorship or a country, where an
authoritarian regime has been established. Belarus’ real
problem is whether or not the above-mentioned algorithm
of transformation from Communist totalitarianism to
authoritarianism and from authoritarianism to an open
democratic society will ever become reality. While inter-
nally, the logic of history and the trends of development
should sooner or later bring about cardinal political and
economic reforms, lots depend on the external setting.
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easy one. It lies between two great powers – the European
Union and the Russian Federation. Each of them aims at
including the country into the sphere of its inﬂuence, and
the outcome of Belarus’ model of development will heavily
depend onwhich of these two powers will win this tug-of-
war and whether or not the Belarusian leader, be it Luka-
shenko or anyone else, will be wise and ﬂexible enough to
further protect the country’s national interests, preserve
and augment its national asset and play a worthy role in
international affairs.
Whereas the answers to these questions should be
sought, perhaps, in not so remote future, here it would be
important to sum up the characteristics of the Belarusian
model of development. The bottom line of the Belarusian
model is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union an
authoritarian regime was established in Belarus, which
helped avoid plundering the country under the guise of
privatization and market-oriented economy. Thus,
a powerful barrier was put against the formation of
a cleptocratic pseudo-elite4 who having recourse to
beautiful slogans on democracy, human rights and
fundamental freedoms, could and would have established
a regime of their personal power and personal interests.
True, the above-mentioned Belarusian dilemma of
development is far from being resolved, and most probably
the country will face further challenges both internally and
externally.Nevertheless, if thepositive trendsprevail, Belarus
willhavemuchbetterchances tobecomeagenuineEuropean
state than many post-Soviet countries, whose model of
development can hardly be characterized by deﬁnitions
taken from the usual political lexicon of modern times.5. The Russian model
While the Baltic countries’ and Belarus’ models of
development are based on strategically clear and struc-
turally logical foundations – Western type democracy
regime in the case of the former and authoritarian regime
in the case of the latter – the model of development of
Russia and the remaining states, emerged after the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union, is hard to characterize within
the framework of the existing terms and deﬁnitions.
At ﬁrst sight, it seems that an analyst should encounter
no difﬁculty when tackling the situation in those countries.
Indeed, Russia, Ukraine, a number of countries in the
Southern Caucasus and Central Asia proclaimed after the
independence their determination and goodwill to embark
upon political and socio-economic reforms to promote
democratic values and achieve prosperous life for their
peoples. The ﬁrst president of independent Russia, Boris
Yeltsin, who heavily relied on a cohort of young and
ambitious politicians, launched a thesis supported by the
leaders of the bulk of the newly independent countries on4 This expression is taken from: “Chisinau Declaration of the Presidents
of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova on the Supremacy of Democratic
Values and Principles”; document distributed at the request of Georgia
and Moldova to the OSCE participating States, SEC.DEL/48/05, 3 March
2005, p.2.the transition period.5 According to this thesis such
a period was necessary to transform the Soviet totalitarian
system into real democracy through privatization of
enterprises, banks, infrastructure and other branches
of economy, encouragement of private business, creation of
appropriate environment for free media, conduct of free
and fair elections, establishment of a multi party system
and the like.
Nevertheless, life brought about quite a different
scenario. In a rather short span after the independence it
became evident that the newly emerged countries had
been deviating further and further from the proclaimed
goals and strategic targets aimed at implementing real
democratic reforms in the political and socio-economic
spheres. In particular, the privatization ended up with
appropriation of the major enterprises and other econom-
ically signiﬁcant assets by a handful of people dubbed
“oligarchs”. Those in power up until now justify the oli-
garchs’ appearance by the rules of market economy, often
referring to themedieval Europe’s primary accumulation of
capital, or hinting that free market quite naturally is regu-
lated by the jungle law. One could even agree with such
argumentations, absurd as they might be, if not the highly
doubtful circumstances, in which the whole story of
privatization in Russia and some other post-Soviet coun-
tries has unfolded. It is obvious that those undertakings had
nothing to do with real market economy and catered to the
interests of a fewmembers of society versus the interests of
the people and the state.
It goes without saying that this upheaval in the sphere
of economy could not occur without the support from the
political quarters. More than that, the political leadership
did not simply condone but took active part in the shameful
appropriation of popular assets. Proclaiming a ‘transition
period’ turned out to be a signal of complacency and
impunity.
Thus, under the slogans of democracy, market economy,
individual rights and freedoms a few people, sometimes
with suspicious past, appropriated the national asset of
a huge country. The merger of the oligarchs with the
political leadership, when each of the two parts of the
hybrid could not exist without the other part’s support and
co-operation, led to a new and unexpected situation, which
inﬂuenced the whole spectrum of political and socio-
economic life in Russia and a number of other post-Soviet
countries. Trying to understand how this could be possible
leads us to the following conclusion.
The tragedy of Russia and the bulk of the other post-
Soviet countries consists in the fact that having destroyed
the old structures of power, having rejected the obsolete
principles of political and economic governance, having
gotten rid of the tools of control over the population but
also over the nomenklatura, including its highest repre-
sentatives, the new leadership could not or did not want to5 In his Addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 1999
President Yeltsin has focused on the tremendous difﬁculties and hard-
ships triggered by the political and socio-economic reforms as a natural
side effect of the transition period. Whereas such arguments could be
taken seriously in the beginning of Yeltsin’s rule, their relentless repeti-
tion by the end of the 1990s clearly indicates that this rhetoric served to
justify the kakistocratic regime’s disastrous consequences.
6 See Charter of Organization for democracy and economic develop-
ment – GUAM, adopted on 23 May 2006, www.guam.org.ua/en/node/450.
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governance, could not or did not want to replace the
totalitarian methods of control, which secured responsi-
bility through fear of being persecuted, with effective and
efﬁcient methods of control and responsibility through
democratic mechanisms.
The outcome is well known: devaluation of the notion
itself of democracy and hatred by a considerable part of
population of anything associated with the democratic
reforms in the politics and economy; nostalgia of many
people among the old and middle generation for the old
good Soviet times; overwhelming mercantilism with its
idée ﬁx of making quick and easy money; thriving
corruption, protectionism and impunity.
At this juncture, a question may arise: what is then the
nature of power of those leaders, and what kind of regime
has been established in those countries?
Clearly, notwithstanding the slogans and the pro-
claimed goals, this was not a democracy, because the power
was taken not by the people but by the state-oligarchic
rulers. This was not a dictatorship or authoritarianism in
the Belarusian sense, because authoritarianism establishes
clear and strict rules imposing responsibility of any
employee or government structures’ member before his/
her supervisor and before the smoothly functioning struc-
tures of state control.
The unusual and unprecedented situation created as
a result of a merger between the ruling political forces and
the oligarchic structures brings about the necessity of non-
standard deﬁnition to characterize the real and not desir-
able changes in Russia and a number of countries with
a similar model of development.
The gist of the regime established as a result of those
changes could be characterized by the ancient Greek world
“kakistocracy” – Government by the worst citizens. In the
context of this article this phenomenon may be deﬁned in
the following way.
Kakistocracy is a political and socio-economic regime
based on plundering of the state’s and the people’s asset
and property through a merger between the political
leadership and the criminal oligarchic structures under
the guise of the democratization of the society, intro-
duction of market relations in economy, the rule of law
and priority of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
The major features of kakistocracy are: usurpation of
power through unfair and falsiﬁed elections; growing
polarization of the society, impoverishment of the bulk
of population and enrichment of a handful of nouveaux
riches; selling out to the foreign capital the economic
and other assets based on clan interests; thriving
corruption and the rule of lawlessness.
Of course, the expression “Government by the worst”
shouldnot beunderstood inaway that thepolitical leadersor
the representatives of the oligarchic circles are bad guys and
bastards. Clearly, this is not the case. Often one can happen
among them very knowledgeable, well-educated, polite
persons, many of them, perhaps, sincerely considering
serving thehomelandas their supremeobjective. The thing is
thatwhateverandhowever theydoturns into theirproﬁt and
against the interests of the nation. The reason of such state ofaffairs is that the very essence, the very nature of power
remains intact. It does not stem from the interests of larger
segments of the population but is oriented toward a narrow
circle of persons. In order to break this vicious circle there is
a need of extraordinary and non-standard measures. This
matter will be analyzed in a relevant section of this article.
Summing up, it should be emphasized that kakistocracy
is the basic element of Russia’s and some other newly
independent countries’ post-Soviet model of development.
Kakistocracy is the key to understanding the root causes
which have shaped and will further shape the behaviour of
those countries’ political leadership and their decision-
making fraught with serious consequences both externally
and internally.
6. The split of the CIS: centrifugal and centripetal
forces
The analysis of the above-mentioned three distinct
models of development is only a ﬁrst necessary step toward
understanding the real situation in the post-Soviet coun-
tries. There is a no less important subject for analysis all the
more complicated since it has triggered different, some-
times conﬂicting interpretations. This subject is the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Already the
very reason of the CIS formation has become a matter of
misinterpretations and opposite views. According to one
opinion the CIS was created in order to insure a civilized
divorce of the countries, which used to be part of a single
state formation. According to another opinion the CIS was
established to restore the broken political, economic and
other ties between those countries with the prospect of
reuniﬁcation under the umbrella of a new super power at
a qualitatively new level.
The truth, however, consists in the fact that the CIS has
simplyceased its existence already in themiddle of the1990s
as a result of an irreversible split. The fault line lies between
the centrifugal and centripetal forces toward Moscow.
6.1. Centrifugal forces
It is exactly in mid-1990s that a new political alliance
comprising a number of former Soviet countries (GUAM:
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was shaped.
Formally, this new alliance was established in October 1997
as a Consultative Forum. Thereafter, GUAM witnessed
a certain evolution, when the Consultative Forum was
transformed into a Union (June 2001) followed by the
creation of the Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development (May 2006) with a Council and a Secretariat
based in Kiev. In 2004, the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly
was established.
According to GUAM Charter the purpose of the Orga-
nization is the promotion of democratic values, the rule of
law and human rights, insuring sustainable development,
enhancing international and regional security and stability,
etc.6 True, these proclaimed goals reﬂected the new Orga-
nization’s good will and commitment to internationally
V. Abadjian / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 153–163158recognized values. However, GUAM was shaped not only
for the sake of joining its members’ efforts to achieve those
goals. Two major incentives have led to GUAM formation
and activities. Both can be detectedwith naked eye. They lie
on the surface and reﬂect what is beneath.
All four GUAM states include national minority territo-
rial units which adamantly strive for their independence. In
the time of GUAM inception in Georgia these were
Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia; in Azerbaijan – the
Upper Karabakh; in Moldova – the Transdniestrian region
and in Ukraine – the Crimea. Although since the mid-1990s
in some of these areas considerable developments have
occurred, it is so far too early to speak of any cardinal
change or conﬂict settlement. It goes without saying that
the common nature of danger that the central governments
faced led to a commonality of aims and interests and to
a need for unifying their efforts in the hope that together
the problem could be overcome easier and faster.
Other communality is GUAM members’ reorientation
toward new security arrangements and new strategic
partners. In case of Ukraine and Georgia this is more than
obvious, and the question of their membership in NATO,
notwithstanding considerable difﬁculties, seems to be
a matter of time. In case of Moldova and Azerbaijan the
situation is less evident. Nevertheless, at the end of the day
their western orientation should prevail, especially, given
the attractive force of two countries belonging to the Euro-
Atlantic community – Romania and Turkey both of them
having traditional links with, respectively, Moldova and
Azerbaijan.
These two circumstances have objectively played
a decisive role in GUAM drifting away from Russia. Indeed,
the break-away unrecognized territorial units heavily rely
on Russia in their quest for independence. In its turn, Russia
tries to use these expectations as a trump card to advance
its strategic interests and prevent GUAM from deﬁnitively
getting out of its political inﬂuence. The August 2008
events in the South Ossetia are perhaps the best illustration
to this.
It is natural that the GUAM countries, if the trend of
rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic security arrange-
ments is to prevail, must accept the rules of the game and
make decisive movement toward a real democratization of
their internal life. To maximize their chances of acceptance
into the NATO they have to think about making serious and
not faked reforms to establish the principle of separation of
powers, promote the rule of law and human rights and
translate solemn declarations about democracy into real
life. In particular, the “orange revolutions” in Georgia and
Ukraine took place, on the one hand, because of a total
ﬁasco of the kakistocratic regimes and, on the other hand,
because of the aspiration of the new political leaders to
stick to European and American orientation and scale of
values.
On 18 August 2009, Georgia withdrew from the CIS. Is
this the beginning of a formal disintegration, will the other
GUAM members follow suit, what will be the impact of
Georgia’s decision on the overall trends of development in
the post-Soviet countries? Only further unfolding of events
is able to answer these questions. At this stage, one can
stress that this ﬁrst formal withdrawal is an additional cleardemonstration of the split of the former Soviet countries
into two distinct groups. We have touched upon the
centrifugal group. It is now time to seewhat the actual state
of things is when it comes to the other group centripetal to
Moscow.
6.2. Centripetal forces
Compared to the centrifugal group, the second group of
countries has adopted a diametrically different policy vis-à-
vis Russia. The members of this group – Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – have
opted for security arrangements under the auspices of
Russia and, consequently, have found themselves in the
sphere of Russian inﬂuence not only from the security but
also from political and economic viewpoints. The attribu-
tion of these countries to the centripetal group is not based
on their belonging to the CIS. Here, the basic principle is
rather their membership to the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), which tends to become a well-struc-
tured and potentially strong politico-military organization
and as such should be taken into serous consideration.
It goes without saying that the above-mentioned
countries are not homogenous and have sometimes
differing political agenda. Armenia has adopted foreign
policy based on “complementarity”, to put it simply,
equally close relations with Russia and the West; Belarus is
subject of inﬂuence from both the West and the East, and it
is not knownwhether or not the tug-of-war between them
will ever yield a result; the Central Asian countries are also
subject to different inﬂuences, having in mind, apart from
Russia, China and serious security threats coming from
Afghanistan and northwest of Pakistan. Notwithstanding
these speciﬁcs of separately taken CSTO members, there is
one prevailing circumstance uniting them around
a common goal: the strategic orientation toward enhancing
politico-security alliance headed by Russia.
The Charter of the CSTO, adopted in 2002, clearly states
that the purpose of the Organization is to promote peace,
strengthen international and regional security and stability,
and ensure the collective defense of the independence, the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states.
Without casting any doubt over these intentions, it also
should be stressed that, like GUAM, the CSTO apart from
these proclaimed goals has a hidden agenda. The American
analyst, Major (P) John A. Mowchan, 2009, has clearly
pointed to this circumstance, stressing that: ‘[t]he milita-
rization of the CSTO alliance and its transformation into
a credible security organization could bolster the Kremlin’s
ability to limit U.S. and Western inﬂuence in Eurasia. It
could also allow Russia an enhanced ability to increase its
control over former Soviet-controlled states and re-create
an alliance similar to the Warsaw Pact”.
At this very juncture, this conclusion may seem to be
premature. However, it goes in line with the recently
adopted Russian National Security Strategy and reﬂects the
strategic approaches of the post-Yeltsin Russian leadership
in terms of security and foreign policy. Certainly, it is not
possible to predict whether the Russian strategic domina-
tion will materialize or the existing differences will make
the CSTO fall apart, as was the case with the CIS.
7 This expression came into use under Yeltsin and meant the former
USSR countries as “near abroad” and the others as “far abroad”.
8 Vladimir Putin, Intervention at the broadened session of the State
Council on “On the Strategy of Russia’s development until 2020”,
8 February 2008, http://www.intelros.ru/strategy/gos_rf/1814-vladimir-
putin.-vystuplenie-na.html.
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point to another similarity. All CSTO members, except
Belarus, represent kakistocratic regimes. Once again, this is
a general bottom line and in no way does it deny the
existing differences between them. However, the kakisto-
cratic nature of these regimes has determined the major
directions of the relevant countries’ internal and external
policy and serves as a constant generator of their behaviour
and comportment. As such, the logic of developments and
the events that have occurred in the centripetal countries
represent a mirror reﬂection of what has happened in
Russia – the founding mother of kakistocracy.
7. The Putin’s doctrine and Cold War II
Russia’s post-Soviet history can be divided into two
distinct periods: the 1990s – Yeltsin’s rule and the 2000s –
Putin’s rule. President Boris Yeltsin was a statesman, who
played a major historic role in Russia’s post-Soviet devel-
opments. His rule was contradictory and controversial. It
also can be roughly divided into two parts: the destruction
of the communist ideology, the communist party and the
communist empire in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
laying the ground of kakistocracy thereafter by conducting
reforms, whose ﬁnal outcome was creation and strength-
ening of criminal oligarchic pseudo-elite and its merger
with the political leadership. It is hard to say which one of
these accomplishments will serve as a criterion for
assessing Yeltsin’s contribution to the world history in, say,
50 years or so. In any case, Yeltsin’s example clearly
demonstrates that in times of historic turmoil the role of
the leader becomes decisive in shaping a given country’s
future.
As the logic and the trends of developments of Russia in
the 1990s heavily depended on the ﬁgure of its ﬁrst pres-
ident, so the trends of the country’s developments in the
ﬁrst decade of the 21st century were shaped under the
strategic leadership of Russia’s second president Vladimir
Putin. It might be useful to consider the main differences
between these two periods and their impact on the inter-
national relations.
When it comes to the differences with regard to internal
policy, it should be underlined that from the point of view
of the nature of power Russia has not changed since its
independence. Both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s regimes are
typical kakistocracies insofar they pursue the political and
economic interests of those in and around the power. Putin
got rid of some oligarchs and tried tomake a new order. But
this led to a mere replacement of some old oligarchs with
new ones, while the system itself remained intact. As to
making order, this was and has been done through the
centralization of state institutions, the curtailing of the
political life’s diversity and the strengthening of the law
enforcement structures with the straightforward approach
that order can be and should be re-established by central-
ized power and force.
This same straightforward approach is typical also for
Russia’s foreign political strategy. Unlike Yeltsin, who
declared during the turmoil triggered by the collapse of the
USSR that its constituent republics should take as much
sovereigntyas theycould, thus revealingabroadmindednessof a statesman, Putin’s Russia in its relations with the “near
and far abroad”7 heavily relies on politico-military compo-
nent of security and believes that richness in oil and gas is
a privilege affording the country to dictate its rules whom-
soever and howsoever.
This approach is the cornerstone of modern Russia’s
domestic and external policy and as such has been reﬂected
in the country’s most important and authoritative docu-
ments. In 2003, the “Energy Strategy of Russia for the period
until 2020” was adopted, which from the outset stated the
following: “Russia possesses considerable deposits of ener-
getic resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex,
which represents a basis of economic development, an
instrument of carrying out internal and external policy. The
country’s role in the word energetic markets deﬁnes to
a great extent its geo-political inﬂuence.”
The same strategic view is reﬂected in the “National
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020”,
promulgated by President Medvedev on 12 May 2009.
Chapter 9 of the document states: “Transition from the
block confrontation to the principles of multi-vector
diplomacy, as well as Russia’s resource potential and the
pragmatic policy of using it have broadened the possibili-
ties of the Russian Federation for enhancing its inﬂuence in
the world”. Another part of the document concerning the
national defense obviously stems from the old Cold War
times’ rhetoric. It states: “The threats to the military secu-
rity are: the policy of a number of leading foreign countries
aimed at obtaining overwhelming superiority in the mili-
tary sphere, ﬁrst of all in strategic nuclear forces..” (Under
Chapter IV Enhancing National Security Part 1. National
Defense).
These principles, enshrined in the Russian cornerstone
documents, have been reiterated on many occasions by
presidents Putin and Medvedev, respectively. Thus, shortly
before handing over his ofﬁce toMedvedev in his speech on
the country’s national strategy in February 2008, Vladimir
Putin (2008) underlined that “[t]he only alternative of
deterring NATO’s expansion and other hostile politico-
military moves toward Russia is developing the production
of new types of arms not yielding by their quantitative
characteristics those at the disposal of other states and in
certain cases even surpassing them.”8
In his latest Address to the Federal Assembly of 12
November 2009, President Medvedev (2009) clearly stated
that “[o]ur foreign policy must be exclusively pragmatic”.
Although throughout his Address Medvedev has empha-
sized that the key word of his politics was “modernization
of Russia”, in reality, the key world of the Russian politics
after the year 2000 is “pragmatism”: pure pragmatism,
deprived of any ideological basis or any more or less
considerable idea, able to lay the ground for elaborating
serious strategic approaches of a country, which pretends
to be a superpower.
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Russian leadership let us refer to Medvedev’s article enti-
tled “Go Russia!”(http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/
10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml). All in all, the article
leaves a mixed impression. It is highly critical and singles
out a number of acute problems and threats that may have
a long-lasting and highly negative inﬂuence on the coun-
try’s development. These are: “inefﬁcient economy, semi-
Soviet social sphere, negative demographic trends, and
unstable Caucasus” (p.2). Furthermore, Medvedev strongly
criticizes corruption, paternalistic attitudes and a number
of other scourges preventing Russia from progress and
modernization. However, the article does not contain any
sound analysis of the root causes of all these negative
elements. It does not reﬂect the very essence of the
developments in the country after its independence.
Therefore, the set of recommendations on solving those
problems is of a rather technical nature void of strategic
vision. Medvedev’s vision is based rather on common
sense, his proposals for Russia’s modernization in the ﬁeld
of economy, social sphere, human rights and the rule of law,
democratic governance, etc., cannot but be praised. The
problem is that they are of little relevance to today’s
country, and the Utopian picture of a prosperous, strong,
just and democratic Russia, so emotionally depicted by
Medvedev, in fact, does not inspire, because it lacks the
most important thing: a spiritual concept of Russian
national revival, without which all reforms at technical
level are doomed to be just a next failure, damaging the
Russian national dignity and hampering its huge civiliza-
tional potential to promote international peace and
progress.
Taking into thorough consideration the developments
in Russia since 2000s, the strategic documents adopted by
the country’s leadership in the ﬁeld of national, military,
energetic security, the Russian leaders’ statements, as well
as their practical steps undertaken in both domestic and
external policy, it should be concluded that we are dealing
with a well-structured and well-elaborated strategy. This
strategy of the modern Russia’s leadership, perhaps, can be
better characterized, if we place it into the format of
a doctrine. Since the initiator and the adamant imple-
menter of the doctrine is Putin, whereas Medvedev has
only followed suit, it would be appropriate to say that we
are dealing with the Putin’s doctrine. To put it succinctly,
the Putin’s doctrine aims at centralization of power and
uniformity of political life, internally, and at restoring
Russia’s superpower status through heavy reliance on
military force and energetic resources, externally. It should
be added that Russia’s aspiration to restore its superpower
status is quite natural and understandable. What raises
concern, is the way and the methods that the country’s
leadership has adopted to achieve it. While in the last part
of this article an attempt will be done to demonstrate how
this aim could be achieved in a civilized way, here it is
appropriate to concentrate on another matter of concern.
This matter of concern is the real threat of relapse into
renewed tough confrontation between the West and the
East or recurrence of the Cold War under new historic
circumstances and conditions. Indeed, the euphoria,
mentioned in this article’s introductory part, roughlyspeaking lasted a decade: from 1991 to 2001. Two historic
events frame this decade – the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the collapse of the Twin Towers. This decade was
dominated by a unipolar world order under the US
supremacy. The American ideas of liberal democracy were
especially predominant at that time, and many believed
that the “universal democratic revolution”, at least in the
Euro-Atlantic area, was coming to a triumphal completion.
The destruction of the “evil empire” seemed to be adequate
to the eradication of the “evil” as such. Nevertheless, 11/9
clearly demonstrated the end of the American supremacy,
insofar a country allowing such a tragic blow cannot be
considered by deﬁnition as being the only superpower.
Exactly at this juncture the ﬁrst symptoms of Cold War II
have appeared.
One of the most convincing examples of the above-
mentioned danger of relapse into tough confrontation is
the history of the evolution of the OSCE. Created in the
middle of 1970s as a diplomatic platform for negotiations
between the West and the East, it served to re-conﬁrm the
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements as set forth by the
Yalta agreements of 1945. In early 1990s after the fall of
the Berlinwall the OSCE adopted a number of documents in
the ﬁrm conviction that Yalta had remained in the past and
that a new era of democracy, peace and unity would now
determine Europe’s security and progress. Nevertheless, as
of early 2000s the Organization found itself in a deep crisis
due to the newly emerged dividing lines between the
considerably broadened West and the considerably
shrunken East.
Russia and its allies, namely, Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, have on
many occasions made joint statements at the OSCE’s
permanent Council’s and other structures’ sessions,
appealing upon the other participating States to reform the
Organization, to relinquish the practice of double stan-
dards, to restore its role as the universal mechanism of pan-
European security. However, there is little wonder that
those appeals have remained the voice of one crying in the
wilderness. The responsibility for European security
architecture, speaking of Europe as such, has been taken
over by the NATO and the European Union, and there
cannot be any backward movement to the middle of the
1970s, to the status quo ante, when the OSCE was estab-
lished. This is not to say that the Organization’s crisis has
been triggered exclusively by Russia and its allies. Western
Europe has fully taken proﬁt from the end of the Cold War
in its favour, sometimes subduing the logic and the pace of
historic development to the expediency of military and
geo-political enlargement. Whatsoever the reasons might
be, this enlargement was due ﬁrst and foremost to the huge
political, economic and cultural attractiveness of the
European Union versus the Russian heavy reliance on
imposing itself by force and energetic blackmail.
The existence of dividing lines in the Euro-Atlantic area
of security and the need of its abolition have been reﬂected
in the OSCE documents adopted at highest levels. The
freshest example is the Ministerial Declaration of the 17th
OSCE Ministerial Council which took place on 1-2
December 2009 in Athens. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of 56 OSCE participating States have pointed out that:
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area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines
and zones with different levels of security remains
a common goal, which we are determined to reach”.
Furthermore: “Our highest priority remains to re-establish
our trust and conﬁdence, as well as to recapture the sense
of common purpose that brought together our predeces-
sors in Helsinki almost 35 years ago”.9
Back to square one: the OSCE has spent almost 35 years
to realize that its highest priority “remains to recapture the
sense of common purpose”. It is beyond the subject of this
article to further concentrate on the OSCE and the ways
that could re-establish trust and conﬁdence among its
participating States. Here it should be noted time and again
that the Organization’s divide and despaired efforts to
overcome the confrontation eloquently speak of the real
possibility of engaging into another Cold War with all its
damaging consequences to say the least.
While overcoming such a situation will require joint
efforts and solidarity, it is ﬁrst and foremost Russia and its
allies that should adapt themselves to the new realities,
whatever bitter they can be: the reality of the collapse of the
communist system and communist values, the reality of the
Western supremacy and enlargement, the reality of huge
difﬁculties of internal development due to the hurdles
imposedby thekakistocratic regime. Butwith thepassage of
time it becomes clearer and clearer that kakistocracy is so
deeply embedded in the system of rule of the above-
mentioned countries that it can hardly be overthrown
without decisive and coercive actions. The “orange” or
“colour revolutions” occurred in a number of post-Soviet
countries are the best testimony to this afﬁrmation,
however strange andunacceptable itmayseematﬁrst sight.
8. Orange revolutions
When on 23 November 2003 President Shevardnadze of
Georgia resigned under the pressure of popular unrest and
indignation, no one could suppose that this same scenario
would be soon repeated in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The
frequency and similarity of the situations of upheaval
triggered by crisis of power and popular demonstrations in
these and some other post-Soviet countries allowed to
draw a common denominator by dubbing such situations
as “orange” or “colour” revolutions. They have been com-
mented and interpreted from different, sometimes, dia-
metrically opposite viewpoints, ranging from praise and
admiration to condemnation and ill-disguised hatred.
Those who are positive refer to the triumph of democracy
and the will of people vis-à-vis corrupt leaders and
regimes. Those who are negative believe that these revo-
lutions were nothing else but an unconstitutional attempt
to change the regime, masterminded and ﬁnanced from
abroad, mostly from the United States.
The book “Orange Nets: from Belgrade to Bishkek”,
which contains a number of articles on the “colourful”
events in the post-Soviet countries, is perhaps the most9 Press Release “Declaration adopted at OSCE Ministerial Council in
Athens charts way ahead for dialogue on European security”, Athens, 2
December 2009, http://www.osce.org/item/41874.htmloutspoken evidence of harshest criticism. The contributors
concentrate on the events in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, as well as on the ﬁnancial
and operational instruments activated by the “foreign
powers” in order to achieve a regime change in those
countries. Their conclusion is unequivocal and is best
expressed by the editor, Natalia Narochnitskaya, a well-
known Russian political scientist and practitioner, in her
introduction to the book. She states that a series of “orange”
revolutions some twenty years ago would be called coup-
d’États (p.5).
To support this “conspiracy theory”, the authors refer to
foreign embassies’ and foundations’ political support of and
ﬁnancial investment in the opposition political parties and
civic movements, trying to prove that the events occurred
in several post-Soviet countries were caused by an attempt
to further restrict Russia’s inﬂuence through creation of
a “sanitary cordon” around it. The truth is, however, not
that simple and unequivocal. One should not deny that
a number of American NGOs and U.S.-ﬁnanced local civil
society organizations have really developed projects and
other activities in order to strengthen the liberal demo-
cratic values in the CIS. Beyond any doubt, this was meant
to enhance the opposition movements, parties and civil
society as those projects’ natural counterparts. These
activities could be interpreted either as a sincere aspiration
to assist the newly independent states in their drive for
democracy or as an attempt to impose alien values through
interference in the internal affairs of the states in question.
More than that, one could also argue that the U.S. and the
West, in general, had their own geo-political agenda, which
in light of the above-mentioned trends of deepening
dividing lines were really meant to broaden their sphere of
inﬂuence under the guise of progress and democracy.
Notwithstanding all these arguments, as true as they
might seem, one cannot refrain from making a rather
paradoxical conclusion. The paradox is that although the
target of the harsh critics of the “orange revolutions” is
“foreigners” and their “agents of inﬂuence”, in reality, they
aim at the peoples of those countries. Indeed, such
analytical exercises suppose that the role of peoples, their
right to make a meaningful choice and express their will
through democratic electoral procedure is nothing more
than pure formality. The electorate, thus, is reduced to be
a mere instrument for regime change, which can easily be
manipulated under the inﬂuence of foreign ideas and
money. Is not this a highly cynical and disdainful approach
toward the people, whose interests the contributors of the
above-mentioned book pretend to defend with all their
analytical wisdom and energy.
Apart from this somewhat emotional argument, one
should provide with the main objection to the “conspiracy
theory” in post Soviet countries. As a matter of fact, this
“theory” totally ignores the primary importance of the
internal prerequisites and factors, which are a condition
sine qua non, when it comes to regime change. In other
worlds, you can spend billions of dollars, you can train
armies of NGOs, you can guide the opposition political
parties’ activities, and all the same, you will be doomed to
a failure, if the opposition does not have any more or less
signiﬁcant popular support. Otherwise, how could be
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consistent political and material support to opposition
political parties, individuals and civil society representa-
tives in Belarus, the regime change there could not take
place in the past and to all evidence would not occur in the
foreseeable future either.
The Belarusian context has already been discussed in
this article. It remains to reiterate that Lukashenko’s rule
will come to an end only by virtue of internal factors.
Belarus, like any other country, has been developing, and
this development will bring about either an open, demo-
cratic society or uniﬁcation with Russia. It is impossible to
say with certainty, when this time will come. But it is
possible to say with certainty that in both cases Luka-
shenko will leave the political scene. He is ﬁt to rule the
country as an authoritarian leader, but not as a democrat or
a vassal.
Armenia can serve as another eloquent example against
the “orange revolution” theory. Here too the opposition
could not topple Kocharian’s and his follower Sargsian’s
regime for the same reason of lack of internal prerequisites
and conditions. Nonetheless, if in Belarus the opposition’s
failurewas due to the obvious lack of support by the bulk of
population, in Armenia the reason can be explained by
another phenomenon.
Armenia, perhaps, is the most kakistocratic country in
the post-Soviet area. This does not require any lengthy
explanations. Sufﬁce to mention two black dates in the
country’s recent history: 27 October 1999, when the Pres-
ident of Parliament and the Prime Minister along with six
MPs wheremassacred by an armed gang at a parliamentary
session, and 1-2 March 2008, when 9 demonstrators and
a policemanwere killed in the aftermath of peaceful protest
rallies, organized by the leader of the opposition, ﬁrst
President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian, and triggered
by the rigged presidential election of 19 February 2008. The
gravity of situation in today’s Armenia stems not only from
the tragic nature of these events but also, and even more,
because the perpetrators have not been discovered up until
now and no one believes they would be discovered under
the current regime.
Nevertheless, the situation in 2008 in Yerevan was very
similar to that in Tbilisi in 2003 and in Kiev in 2004. Why
then the massive popular protests in Yerevan were unable
to annul the falsiﬁed election results with a predictable
outcome of Ter-Petrossian’s return to the presidential
ofﬁce. This can be explained by twomajor reasons. First, the
kakistocratic leaders of Georgia and Ukraine did not go as
far as to crash the popular protests by heavily armed
groups, including snipers, as it was the case in Yerevan.
Second, Ter-Petrossian himself was the founding father of
kakistocracy in Armenia. In early 1990s he and his cronies
from the Armenian National Movement started the coun-
try’s systematic plunder. Electoral fraud, merger of state
structures with the oligarchic ones, impoverishment of the
bulk of population against the background of enrichment of
a handful of kakistocrats – all this was initiated by Ter-
Petrossian. By virtue of this fact alone, he could not win the
battle. He was doomed to failure by deﬁnition. Hence, there
is little wonder that in the most critical situations during
February-March 2008 he was unable to demonstratecourage and determination to guide the people’s will and
resolve the crisis in favour of justice and democracy. Thus,
Ter-Petrossian’s inability to lead, as well as the absence of
any other opposition leader, who might live up to the
expectations of the people at the most critical historic
moment, became a major reason for the “apricot” revolu-
tion’s ﬁasco.
In cases of both Belarus and Armenia the reasons for
failure to achieve regime change goes to the internal
factors. True, one should not underestimate the role of
external support, but this role is always a secondary and
subordinate one.
The theory of “orange revolutions” is false. In the ﬁnal
analysis, it serves to justify the post-Soviet kakistocratic
regimes’ unwillingness to give up the Cold War mentality
and the confrontational way of striving for their domestic
and foreign political interests. First of all, this concerns
Russia, which in pursuit of its overall goal of restoring the
lost inﬂuence has opted for straightforward pragmatism so
alien to its national spirit. But a broadminded national
leader would, perhaps, ﬁnd an alternative and much more
attractive ways of enhancing and promoting Russia’s stra-
tegic agenda both internally and externally.
9. Conclusion
In 1918, a year after the collapse of the monarchy in
Russia the great Russian thinker Nikolai Berdiayev wrote: ,
There is no longer great Russia and there are no longer
universal tasks in front of it.” Surprisingly precise and
perspicacious words. Russia’s greatness and incentive for
achieving and preserving its inﬂuence can be based only on
spiritual values. This has been many times proven by
history itself. Russia can lead and achieve tremendous
results provided it has an idea, an ideology, a universal- and
historic-scale mission to accomplish. The Russian Empire
has expanded and achieved a great deal of economic
prosperity and political inﬂuence not that much due to its
military power as thanks to its central idea of “orthodoxy,
monarchy and nationhood”. The practical undertakings of
the Russian Empire stemmed from this triad and created
a prerequisite for its attractiveness. Paradoxically enough,
even the Soviet Union preserved a great deal of attrac-
tiveness for many peoples of the third world who linked
their hopes for overthrowing the colonialist regimes
having recourse to the Marxist-Leninist ideas. Although
these ideas proved to be false and unrealistic, the impor-
tant here is that even communist Moscow could be and
was for a certain period of time a centre of attractiveness.
Thus, the Soviet expansion was due not only to the military
force, but to the country’s ideological doctrine whatever
false and even disastrous it might be. The conclusion is
obvious: Russia can restore its inﬂuence not through mili-
tary power and natural resources but through restoring its
attractiveness and by means of engaging itself in the
fulﬁllment of great tasks vis-à-vis the historic challenges
that humanity faces at this stage of development. But for
that, Russia needs a great leader who could live up to the
magnitude of the challenges. This in turn will not be
possible unless the country has not gotten rid of
kakistocracy.
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of “orange revolutions” to an unconstitutional attempt to
topple the existing rulers. The post-Soviet countries’
experience has clearly demonstrated that she is, and this is
yet another paradox, absolutely right. The kakistocratic
regimes are able to take any measures all without distinc-
tion to keep their power at any rate, because power is the
source of their richness and self-esteem, it is their raison
d’être, and there is little wonder that they will never give it
up voluntarily. Either they will do that under the huge
pressure of insurgent people or they will permanently and
consistently falsify the elections, stiﬂe individual rights and
freedoms, introduce an atmosphere of fear for the others
and lawless permissiveness for themselves.
Here we come to another conclusion: there are only
minimal, if at all, chances to get rid of kakistiocratic regimes
within the constitutional framework. The kakistocrats’
lawlessness and lack of legitimacy must be tackled by
adequate means. It is impossible to topple illegal power by
legal means or, the other way round, any means to topple
the kakistocrats’ illegal rule is legal. In some countries this
scenario has worked without bloodshed, like in Czecho-
slovakia, in some other countries, unfortunately, it was not
possible to avoid violence, like in Romania. But the logic of
historic events was the same.
The kakistocratic regimes inevitably lead to deteriora-
tion of the political and socio-economic situation, as well as
to degradation in terms of basic values and elementary
human behaviour not only internally. They create perma-
nent tensions also externally, representing, in the ﬁnal
analysis, a serious threat to international peace and secu-
rity. After all, one cannot artiﬁcially divide the nature of
internal and external policy of a given state. Both are
conducted by a single leadership and both stem from the
same principles be they constructive or destructive. The
question is: what will be the answer of the international
community, ﬁrst of all, the EU and the U.S. vis-à-vis such
a situation?
While this topic requires an in-depth analysis, here it
should be brieﬂy underlined that the West has only two
options: 1) either towork toward the kakistocratic regimes’
isolation in the hope that this will accelerate the regimechange from inside and, at the same time, will neutralize to
the extent possible the threats stemming from those
regimes; or 2) to cooperate with the kakistocratic regimes
in the hope that common objectives can be found and
common goals, such as combating terrorism and interna-
tional organized crime or achievement of Millennium
Development Goals can be pursued jointly, thus creating
a window of opportunity for those regimes’ gradual miti-
gation and promoting external prerequisites for internal
changes.
Whereas the effectiveness and efﬁciency of either
option to destroy kakistocracy are far from being obvious,
the preferencemost probably should be given to the second
one. It is only through cooperation, through elaboration
and implementation of a joint platform to achieve common
goals would it be possible to overcome the overall crisis of
identity and establish a balance between selﬁsh state
interests and the common objective of preserving and
promoting universal values.References
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